“Surveys, for instance, were totally unreliable but reinforced that Bob Crowley | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document everything we were doing was right and we became a self-licking ice cream cone.” Bob Crowley | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document military commanders in 20, told government interviewers.
“Every data point was altered to present the best picture possible,” Bob Crowley | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Bob Crowley, an Army colonel who served as a senior counterinsurgency adviser to U.S. presidents, military commanders and diplomats who assured Americans year after year that they were making progress in Afghanistan and the war was worth fighting. The documents also contradict a long chorus of public statements from U.S. He added, “After the killing of Osama bin Laden, I said that Osama was probably laughing in his watery grave considering how much we have spent on Afghanistan.” Jeffrey Eggers | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document “What did we get for this $1 trillion effort? Was it worth $1 trillion?” Jeffrey Eggers | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Jeffrey Eggers, a retired Navy SEAL and White House staffer for Bush and Obama, told government interviewers. Those figures do not include money spent by other agencies such as the CIA and the Department of Veterans Affairs, which is responsible for medical care for wounded veterans. Agency for International Development have spent or appropriated between $934 billion and $978 billion, according to an inflation-adjusted estimate calculated by Neta Crawford, a political science professor and co-director of the Costs of War Project at Brown University. Since 2001, the Defense Department, State Department and U.S. government has not carried out a comprehensive accounting of how much it has spent on the war in Afghanistan, but the costs are staggering. government’s botched attempts to curtail runaway corruption, build a competent Afghan army and police force, and put a dent in Afghanistan’s thriving opium trade. officials acknowledged that their warfighting strategies were fatally flawed and that Washington wasted enormous sums of money trying to remake Afghanistan into a modern nation. With most speaking on the assumption that their remarks would not become public, U.S. Responses to The Post from people named in The Afghanistan Papers
Part 2: Stranded without a strategy Conflicting objectives dogged the war from the start. See the documents More than 2,000 pages of interviews and memos reveal a secret history of the war. “Who will say this was in vain?” Douglas Lute | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document military personnel on bureaucratic breakdowns among Congress, the Pentagon and the State Department. 2,400 lives lost,” Douglas Lute | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Lute added, blaming the deaths of U.S. “If the American people knew the magnitude of this dysfunction. He added: “What are we trying to do here? We didn’t have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking.” Douglas Lute | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document “We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan - we didn’t know what we were doing,” Douglas Lute | Lessons Learned interview | Tap to view full document Douglas Lute, a three-star Army general who served as the White House’s Afghan war czar during the Bush and Obama administrations, told government interviewers in 2015. Click any underlined text in the story to see the statement in the original document
0 kommentar(er)
